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Are Stellar Kinds Natural Kinds? 
A Challenging Newcomer in the Monism/Pluralism and Realism/Antirealism 
Debates 
 
ABSTRACT: Stars are conspicuously absent from reflections on natural kinds and 
classifications, with gold, tiger, jade, and water getting all the philosophical attention. 
This is too bad for, as this paper will demonstrate, interesting philosophical lessons 
can be drawn from stellar taxonomy as regards two central, on-going debates about 
natural kinds, to wit, the monism/pluralism debate and the realism/antirealism debate. 
I show in particular that stellar kinds will not please the essentialist monist, nor for 
that matter will it please the pluralist embracing promiscuous realism à la Dupré. I 
conclude on a more general note by questioning the relationship between taxonomic 
scientific practice and philosophical doctrines of natural kinds.  
 
1. Introduction. “Species are evidently not arbitrary like the grouping of the stars in 
constellations”: Darwin ([1859] 1962, 411) did not have apparently a high opinion of 
stellar taxonomy, nor did the French mathematician and philosopher A. A. Cournot, 
for whom constellations were a typical example of artificial groups of things ([1851] 
1975, 199-208). But stellar taxonomy has come a long way since Darwin and 
Cournot’s time. Yet, it is still remarkably absent from reflections on natural kinds and 
classifications, with gold, tiger, jade and water getting all the philosophical attention. 
It’s a pity for, as we shall see, the practice and achievements of stellar taxonomy raise 
fruitful challenges to the current main philosophical standpoints on natural 
classifications. Moreover, stellar classifications are representative of what many 
taxonomic enterprises are about in science today, that is, coming up with kind-
membership conditions that define epistemically fruitful groupings of entities whose 
diversity is revealed (or even created) by scientific investigation, rather than trying to 
discover the hidden essence of antecedently recognized kinds. In short, from a 
taxonomic point of view, stars share with microbacteria, subatomic particles, 
nanotubes and other members of the bestiary of microbiology and microphysics, a 
lack of “quotidian prehistory” (Daston 2000): they were not part of our reality – and 
therefore not the subject of ordinary-language classifications - before they became 
subject of scientific inquiry and classifications1. Not surprisingly then, I won’t have 
                                                
1  Isn’t that plainly wrong for stars? Surely stars were part of our reality before they 
became subject of scientific inquiry and classifications. But as explained in the next section, 
their ontological status radically changed with the advent of spectroscopic observations that 
revealed their diversity, so that the issue of the relationship between antecendently recognized 
kinds and scientific kinds does not even arise for stars, contrary to the cases of biological 
species or chemical kinds. 
 2 
much to say about traditional issues of reference of ordinary language natural-kind 
names. On the other hand, my discussion of stellar kinds will be directly relevant to  
two other central, on-going debates about natural kinds and classifications, to wit, the 
monism/pluralism debate and the realism/antirealism debate.  
 On the face of it, stellar taxonomy does not seem to be a very monist-friendly 
domain. Take one of the brightest stars of the Northern hemisphere, Vega in the Lyra 
constellation, and ask astrophysicists what kind of star Vega is. Commonly known as 
a “A0 V” star, that is, a relatively hot, slightly bluish “main sequence dwarf”, Vega is 
also classified by astrophysicists observing in the far infrared part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum as a “1n - 18” star, that is, a star with no remarkable 
spectral feature in this domain of wavelength, and for those studying how the light 
emitted by a star varies, Vega is known as a “Delta scuti” type of star, that is, a kind 
of pulsating variable star.  
 My aim in this paper is to investigate how this taxonomic pluralism should be 
interpreted and which metaphysical and epistemological lessons can be drawn from it 
about natural kinds and classifications. I start with a bit of history about stellar 
classifications. Then a (shallow) plunge in the practice of grouping stars will allow us 
to grasp the sources of stellar taxonomic pluralism. Along the way, comparisons with 
two familiar cases – the classification of chemical elements and the classification of 
living organisms-, will bring out the specificities of the stellar case. I then discuss 
whether the stellar world comes prepacked with any objective divisions, putting on 
the carpet both essentialist standpoints on natural kinds and non-essentialist, realist 
ones, such as Dupré’s promiscuous realism (Dupré, 1993). On a more general note, I 
conclude by questioning the relationship between taxonomic scientific practice and 
philosophical doctrines of natural kinds.  
 
2. Historical markers.  As any lover of the celestial wonders knows, nothing looks 
more like a star than another star… even when observed with a telescope2. Not 
surprisingly then, the ordering of stars had long been restricted to the rudimentary task 
of noting their positions and estimating their apparent brightness. The first systematic 
                                                
2  That might be the reason why, by the way, stellar classifications have not yet received 
much philosophical attention, in spite of their rich history and crucial role in astrophysics: 
stellar diversity does not stare in the face as does the diversity of, say, plants, animals, 
minerals or chemical substances. No wonder then than most philosophical discussions about 
carving up the world have been so far restricted to the terrestrial world.   
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survey is attributed to Hipparchus who classified 1080 stars (one fifth of the number 
of stars visible to the naked eye) in 49 constellations ordered by their positions on the 
sky3. Three centuries later, Ptolemy listed 1022 stars divided in six categories of 
apparent brightness. In the XVIIIe and XIXe century, the number of stars ordered by 
positions and magnitude increased significantly. Let us mention the remarkable work 
of Nicolas Louis de La Caille who, in 1750, went with his instruments to the Cape of 
Good Hope to catalog ten thousand stars of the Southern Hemisphere, and Herschel’s 
famous Urano Metria Nova published in 1843, and cataloging 3256 stars of the 
Northern Hemisphere. But the really significant turn in stellar classification came with 
the development of stellar spectroscopy, directly linked to the development of 
spectroscopy in the laboratory.  
On the theoretical side, G. Kirchoff and R. Bunsen (building on previous work 
by J. Foucault) had laid down by the 1860’s the two basic principles of spectrum 
analysis.4 Astronomers first applied these principles to the analysis of the solar 
spectrum and, thanks to progress made on the observational side in photography, they 
were soon able to apply them as well to the analysis of the much fainter stellar 
spectra. By 1880, the spectra of several thousands of stars had been collected, 
revealing their diversity: stellar spectra turned out to differ both in the position of their 
bright lines and in their “color” (which reflect the overall distribution of energy), 
thereby suggesting important differences in the physical properties of the stars. Then 
arose the issue of the origin of this spectral diversity. Was it due to differences in 
temperature, in chemical composition, or both? Did different stellar spectra 
correspond to different stages in the evolution of a star? The intricate arguments 
exchanged by the main protagonists of the debate at that time – the Jesuit A. Secchi, 
H. C. Vogel, J. N. Lockyer and W. Huggins involved a rather fascinating mixture of 
embryonic theoretical knowledge of the behavior of gaseous spheres, empirical 
considerations mainly based on comparisons with spectra obtained in the laboratory, 
                                                
3  The story goes that Hipparchus was at Rhodes observing the sky when he witnessed 
the apparition of a very bright star. He then decided to come up with a catalogue of stars that 
could serve as a reference to record this kind of event. For more on these early catalogues, see 
Pannekoek 1961.  
4  In short, the first principle stated that solids and liquids typically produce continuous 
spectra in the visible, whereas gases produce characteristic emission lines. The second 
principle stated that when a source producing a continuous spectrum is seen through a cold 
gas, the wavelengths of its absorption lines correspond to the wavelengths of the emission 
lines produced by the gas when heated.   
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personal convictions such as the reluctance to give up the idea of cosmic uniformity, 
and influences of the epistemic context of the time, in particular the newly born 
theory of evolution, from which general ideas of evolution were directly (albeit 
loosely) imported.5  
The path leading from this early debate to what is considered today as the 
correct interpretation of differences in stellar spectra covered several decades marked 
both by progress in instrumentations and by theoretical breakthroughs in the general 
understanding of spectra (especially Megh Nad Saha’s work, in the 1920’s, on the 
ionisation of chemical elements). This path having been quite torturous, I can only 
refer to DeVorkin (1978) and Ruphy (1997) for the historical details of its many turns. 
What I want to emphasize here is that spectroscopy did not only reveal the diversity 
of the stars but also triggered a radical mutation in their ontological status. Stars 
definitely lost their status of incorruptible objects inherited from the Ancients to 
progressively become objects having a “natural life”, that is, objects evolving through 
different phases, displaying diverse physical properties. For a long time restricted to 
the study of positions and movements of stars, the task of the astronomer 
progressively came to focus on the understanding of their physical properties and 
evolution. And, most importantly for our purpose, this mutation went hand in hand 
with a radical mutation of the classificatory act. 
So far stars had been classified by apparent properties: the positions listed in 
catalogs such as Ptolemy’s and Herschel’s were apparent positions, corresponding to 
the projection on the celestial vault of the “real” positions of the stars in the Galaxy, 
and brightness, corresponding to the quantity of light received by us, not to the 
quantity of light emitted by the star, called absolute or intrinsic brightness. When 
spectral diversity suggested differences in physical properties, stellar taxonomists 
became more ambitious: their aim was henceforth to go beyond the appearances by 
building classificatory schemes based on intrinsic characters. 
The classification proposed by Secchi in the 1870’s – the first one to be based 
on spectral features - inaugurated this new ambition. Secchi’s observations, as well as 
observations by Vogel, Lockyer and Huggins had led to the conclusion that spectral 
diversity could be organized by grouping stars together in a very limited number of 
                                                
5  Further analysis, in Bachelardian terms, of the influence of contextual values on the 
genesis of stellar classifications can be found in Ruphy 2006. On early interpretations of 
spectral classifications, see also Shapere 1987 and Pannekoek 1961. 
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categories, according to their color. Secchi assorted the several thousands of stars for 
which spectra were available at that time in three categories: “class I” contained the 
blue stars, “class II” the yellow stars such as the Sun and “class III” the red stars. The 
collection of more stellar spectra at higher dispersion soon revealed the 
inhomogeneity of Secchi’s categories, thereby calling for their revision. But the 
essential spirit of modern stellar classifications was already there: assort stars not 
according to how they appear to us, but according to their intrinsic properties. Those 
familiar with the history of scientific classifications may recognize a similar mutation, 
roughly at the same time, that is, in the second half of the XIXe century, in disciplines 
such as crystallography and mineralogy where taxonomy was also the backbone of 
everything else.  
In the wake of Secchi’s work, early spectral classifications were one-
dimensional: stars were assorted into kinds according to their “spectral type”. In 1907, 
the Danish astronomer Ejnar Hertzsprung and the American astronomer Henry Norris 
Russell established by independent means an empirical relation between the spectral 
type and the class of luminosity6. This empirical relation translated into the 
localization of stars in certain specific areas of a two-dimensional diagram (now 
called the Hertzsprung-Russell diagram or, in short, the HR diagram) where stars 
were distributed by these two parameters. Most stars (including our Sun) found a 
place along a diagonal now called the “main sequence” and received the label 
“dwarf”. Brighter stars divided up into different types of categories now called 
“giants”, “supergiants”, etc (see Fig. 1). Stars thus turned out to significantly differ 
not only by spectral type but also by their class of luminosity, which reflects 
differences of volumes and densities. Hence the adoption of this intrinsic property as a 
second taxonomic criterion.  
The epistemic importance of the HR diagram cannot be overstated. Not only 
did it pave the way to the currently most widely used two-dimensional 
classifications7, but also this putting into a table of the stellar multiplicity has been 
                                                
6  The spectral type of a star is defined by the shape of its spectrum in the visible part of 
the electromagnetic spectrum and by the position and brightness of some emission lines. It is 
mainly governed by the temperature of the star. The class of luminosity is defined by the ratio 
of intensity of certain lines located in the visible part of a stellar spectrum and varies with the 
density of the star.  
7  The most comprehensive classification systems are, on the one hand, the “Morgan 
Keenan” or “MK” system of spectral classification and, on the other hand, photometric 
classifications based on color indices. These systems are two-dimensional systems based on 
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fruitful in many other ways. It revealed for instance the existence of families of stars 
having very different volumes and corresponding to different stages of stellar 
evolution, and still plays a key role in the understanding of the physical nature and the 
evolutionary stage of newly observed stars. Since its first elaboration at the beginning 
of the last century, the HR diagram has been revised several times, but its main 
structure has remained essentially unchanged, so that the very history of the 
modifications of the diagram displays its stability and epistemic virtues. For all that, 
astrophysicists could hardly have given into the metaphysical hubris of believing that 
they had come up with the ultimate right way of carving up the celestial world. And 
indeed, the two-dimensional system grounding the HR diagram, based on spectral 
features observable in the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum, was completed 
by other taxonomic systems based on different parameters. In the late 1970’ and 
1980’, with the launch of satellites embarking detectors working in other domains of 
wavelength (in particular in the infrared and the ultraviolet), astronomers began to 
design independent classificatory schemes based on spectral features observable in 
these newly accessible domains. For certain types of stars, an alternative taxonomic 
strategy was to combine these spectral features with “visible” spectral features and 
develop classificatory systems whose dimensions were superior to two.8 Hence a 
multiplication of wavelength-dependent taxonomic systems. It is worth noticing, 
though, that due to practical observational limits (and budgetary constraints…), the 
development of independent classificatory schemes in various regions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, or the refinement of certain existing categories by the use 
of additional criteria, concern only a very limited number of stars compared to the 
number of stars classified in a HR diagram. In other words, there are large differences 
as regards the comprehensiveness of the various taxonomic systems, with systems 
based on visible features being by far the most comprehensive. This predominance is 
easily explained. The Earth atmosphere happens to be transparent and we, human 
observers, happen to see in this domain of wavelength. Not surprisingly then, the most 
                                                
parameters relative to the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum. For more detail see 
Jaschek and Jaschek (1990). 
8  Note that those systems remain local in the sense that each is a refinement of some 
specific chunk of the HR diagram. Adding for instance a UV based citerion can be done only 
for certain homogeneous classes in the visible, such as hot blue stars. The same criterion 
cannot be used for another chunk of the HR diagram, say, red giant stars, for those stars do 
not exhibit features in the UV that would allow to classify them according to this criterion. In 
that case, an additionnal infrared criterion is needed.  
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comprehensive classification systems are relative to this domain. But one can easily 
imagine that alien astrophysicists endowed with a sharp view in, say, the infrared, 
would have come up with large-scale, comprehensive classifications based on infrared 
properties rather than visible ones. Hence the contingency of the current taxonomic 
landscape.  
My skimming through the intricate history of stellar taxonomy has left aside 
the development of taxonomic systems of limited comprehensiveness, based on 
properties that are not read off stellar spectra, such as the classification of stars based 
on the variation of their luminosity. But it should suffice to make vivid the following 
historical tendency: the more mature stellar astrophysics has become (both by getting 
huge amount of complementary observations in various domains of wavelength and 
by improving theoretical understanding of stellar physics), the more taxonomic 
systems have multiplied.   
To make sense of this tendency to pluralism and grasp its philosophical 
imports, we need now a (shallow) plunge in the details of the practice of grouping 
stars. We need in particular a closer look at the kind-membership conditions and the 
resulting philosophically challenging characters of stellar kinds.  
 
3. The art and quirks of grouping stars 
3.1. Stellar structuralism. Stars are grouped together in a class when they exhibit 
features “similar enough” to those of a standard star picked up to define the class. But 
of course, not any feature will do as a similarity parameter. For instance, in spite of 
the fact that this intrinsic property is known for a very large number of stars, stars are 
not classified by their proper motion, for the same reasons that animals are not sorted 
out by, say, their number of hairs, or chemical substances by their color: what stellar 
taxonomists share with their confrères in other scientific domains is a search for 
“privileged” or taxonomically “significant” similarity parameters. My putting these 
epithets between inverted comas follows a widespread habit in philosophical 
discussions about natural kinds and classifications, which conveys a crucial ambiguity 
of the use of the terms. In what sense can similarity parameters be said to be 
“privileged”? A metaphysical reading of the term usually refers to some form of 
essentialism. For less metaphysically inclined philosophers, the reading may be more  
epistemological: a set of similarity parameters is privileged to the extent that it defines 
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epistemically fruitful groupings (i. e. lending themselves to generalizations and 
predictions, playing a role in causal explanations, etc.). Actually, it is hardly 
overstated to claim that the main lines of disagreement between various standpoints 
on natural kinds and classifications (i.e. monism, pluralism, realism, antirealism and 
some combinations of those four) boil down to divergent views of what “privileged” 
means. But until section 5 where I’ll ask whether stellar kinds are natural kinds and 
discuss these divergent views more extensively, I’ll remain neutral as regards the 
appropriate reading of the notion in the astrophysical context, and stick to the 
description of kind-membership conditions in the scientific practice of sorting out 
stars.  
 So what are the similarity parameters that are taken as “privileged” by stellar 
taxonomists? The brief aforementioned historical markers gave us a hint: early 
taxonomic systems were based on spectral features that were measurable for a large 
number of stars and that were deemed significant from a theoretical point of view. 
Such a combination of practical and theoretical considerations later continued to 
shape taxonomic enterprises and still constrains today new classificatory 
developments.  
Astrophysicists want to know how stars form, evolve and die. Their theoretical 
understanding of the behavior of gaseous spheres tells them that parameters such as 
temperature, density or mass loss are determinant parameters in stellar evolutionary 
processes, whereas proper motion or distance from the Earth are not; hence their 
choice of the former, and not the latter, as taxonomic parameters. In short, kind-
membership is conferred by structural properties central for explaining a large variety 
of stellar behaviors.  
I’ve mentioned taxonomic parameters such as spectral type, mass loss, class of 
luminosity, temperature, etc. Following scientific practice, I have mixed together two 
types of parameters, but the distinction between the two types is worth being made 
explicit for epistemological purpose. Taxonomic intrinsic properties may be directly 
or indirectly observable. The spectral type of a star is a directly observable - or 
“manifest” property, for it can be “directly” read off its spectrum9. By contrast, a 
                                                
9  The inverted commas here draw attention to the fact that “direct” observation never 
means “brute” observation in astrophysics. The observer must always correct the signal 
received from the alterations it underwent when light passed through interstellar dust and the 
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structural property such as temperature is a non-directly observable property: quite 
obviously, astrophysicists do not go around space with a thermometer to measure it; 
they have to use elaborate models of stellar atmosphere to derive temperature from 
manifest properties. And the same goes for structural properties such as the radius of a 
star, its rotation speed, its magnetic field or its mass loss. More generally, manifest 
properties are properties of the light emitted by a star, given that no measurement can 
be made in situ. Structural properties are then derived from manifest ones via more or 
less complex theoretical models. Systematic links have been for instance established 
via theoretical models between spectral type and temperature, and also between class 
of luminosity (directly read off a spectrum) and intrinsic brightness or density.10 
Observational access to structural properties is thus mediated by theoretical modeling.  
This form of theory-ladenness has two consequences for the taxonomist. First, 
it leads to a “two-layer” structure of taxonomic systems, with a first layer based 
exclusively on manifest properties and often described as the “empirical” 
classificatory system, and a second layer related to the first via calibrated theoretical 
models (in practice, the two layers are often mixed). If the empirical layer is rather 
stable, astrophysicists have to live with a certain degree of instability of the second 
layer, according to the way calibrations are revised in light of new theoretical and 
observational developments. Second, the theory-ladenness of the observational access 
to structural properties somehow limits the possibilities of choice of taxonomic 
parameters. Not all structural properties deemed significant from a theoretical 
perspective can be systematically related to some manifest properties and used as a 
taxonomic parameter. For instance, astrophysicists interested in stellar evolution 
would be very happy to be able to group stars according to their mass. Unfortunately, 
except for a small fraction of stars, they do not have reliable theoretical models that 
systematically relate this structural property to manifest (i.e. directly observable) 
properties. In short: both practical and theoretical considerations limit the possibilities 
of choice of taxonomic parameters. A structural property deemed significant must be 
linkable to some manifest properties via a theoretical model, and those manifest 
properties must be measurable for a large number of stars.   
                                                
Earth atmosphere, just to mention the main tricky distorting effects that astrophysicists have 
to cope with.  
10  So that a HR diagram can be graduated in any combination of these parameters, that 
is, spectral type or temperature vs. class of luminosity or density or intrinsic brightness. 
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3.2. Resolution Dependency. Most stellar structural parameters (and their 
corresponding manifest properties) vary continuously from one star to another. 
Therefore, in the stellar bestiary, there does not exist any level of genuine 
discontinuity above the level of individual stars. In other words, by analogy with the 
notion of “infimic species” defined by Ellis (2002, 57) as “a species that has no 
subspecies, [and that] is ultimately specific”11, an astrophysicist cannot expect to 
come up with “infimic stellar kinds” (more on the important consequences of that 
point in the last section when I discuss essentialism and realism about kinds). Let’s 
spell out why. Stellar kinds are defined by cutting up the observational continuity into 
boxes. We have seen that stars are grouped together in a class when they exhibit 
structural features “similar enough” to those of a standard star picked up to define the 
class and that those features vary continuously from one star to another. For a given 
set of similarity parameters, whether a star is similar enough to the standard one 
depends on the resolution of the observations used by the classifiers. In other words, 
the degree of similarity between two stars remains dependent on instrumental 
resolution. In the case of classifications based on spectral features, the grouping of 
stars is bound to the dispersion of the spectra. Increasing spectral dispersion reveals 
inhomogeneities in a class homogeneous at lower dispersion, thus calling for the 
creation of subclasses, subsubclasses, etc., to keep a satisfying homogeneity in the 
basic taxonomic unit. Classes of stellar objects being defined by the cutting up of the 
observational continuity, the more resolution you have, the more fine-grained can be 
the cutting. Hence what I call the “resolution dependency” of stellar classifications. 12   
 
3.3. Vagueness. Another straightforward consequence of stellar structure being 
defined by continuous parameters (such as temperature and density) is the vagueness 
of the similarity relations between two stars. As a result, stellar kinds do not have 
sharp boundaries and a star may be classified as intermediate between two kinds. 
                                                
11  Good candidates for the status of infimic kinds are for instance atoms in their stable 
states.  
12  The most comprehensive 2D spectral taxonomic system, the MK system, requires 
spectra at a dispersion of 115 A° / mm (at Hγ).  Spectra at higher dispersion have been 
obtained for stars of a certain spectral type (O stars for instance) leading to the division of the 
corresponding “MK box” into finer boxes. For more detail on what astrophysicists often call 
“precision spectral classification”, see Gray 1994.    
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Consider the two-dimensional taxonomic system based on spectral types (labeled by a 
capital letter and a numeral) and classes of luminosity (labeled by a Roman numeral). 
A “K0 V / K1 V” star is a star whose spectral type and class of luminosity (and the 
corresponding structural properties) are as much “similar enough” to those of the 
standard star defining the kind “K0 V” as they are to those of the standard star 
defining the kind “K1 V”. 
As regards the vagueness of the similarity relations, stellar kinds resemble to a 
certain extent molecular kinds. Because of isomerism, to define molecular kinds, 
similarity of chemical element composition must be supplemented by similarity of 
molecular structure. But as Hendry (2006) reminds us, sameness of molecular 
structure is a vague relation since molecular structure is defined in terms of variables - 
internuclear distances and angles between bonds- that vary continuously. As a result, 
“interatomic geometry will […] group molecules into vague-bounded, overlapping 
clusters of similar structures.” (Hendry 2006, 869)  
 
3.4. Taxonomic nomadism. Another important feature of stellar taxonomy is 
the fact that a star’s classification is not a permanent matter: properties on which 
stellar classifications are based are transitory properties. A star does not have the same 
spectral type, class of luminosity, mass loss, etc., throughout its life. Consider the 
Sun’s classification in the familiar 2D spectral taxonomic system: its localization in a 
HR diagram will change when the Sun evolves. Currently classified as a G2 V star 
(i.e. a yellowhish dwarf star located on the main sequence), it will move onto the red 
giant branch, before ending up in the white dwarf area of the diagram. I will call this 
specificity “taxonomic nomadism”. Note that the pace of stellar taxonomic nomadism 
is rather slow. The Sun will spend altogether more than 8 billion years in its current 
category before moving on to another one. 
 Is taxonomic nomadism an idiosyncrasy of the stellar world? On the face of it, 
stellar taxonomic nomadism has no strict equivalent in the biological realm. An 
organism’s classification is a permanent matter: a new-born tiger is already a tiger and 
remains so during its entire developmental course (whatever the kind-membership 
conditions are - essentialist, phylogenetic, interbreeding, etc.). Only when species are 
considered as individuals rather than sets or classes (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1978)  may 
an analogy be considered. In that case, both species and stars are indeed the subject of 
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evolutionary processes. Considered as spatiotemporally restricted continuous entities, 
a species may evolve into another species. But the analogy remains limited, for 
taxonomic nomadism does not operate at the same ontological level in both cases. 
Stellar taxonomic nomadism concerns the individual members of stellar classes, 
whereas biological taxonomic nomadism does not concern the parts (the individual 
organisms) that form the wholes (species), but the wholes themselves. Actually, the 
closest case to stellar taxonomic nomadism is the phenomenon of natural 
transmutation of chemical elements, where a member of a chemical kind, say, 
thorium, naturally becomes a member of another chemical kind (radium). 
 Taxonomic nomadism may turn out to be an embarrassment for certain 
philosophical standpoints on natural kinds (more on that in the last section), but it is a  
feature much appreciated by astrophysicists. Here’s why. Given the timescale of 
stellar evolution, astrophysicist cannot study evolutionary processes by monitoring the 
evolution of individual stars. To learn about the different evolutionary phases – in 
particular how long a star will spend in each of these phases-, they compare how 
many stars belong to each of the associated stellar kinds. From the statistical 
repartition of stars into kinds, they are then able to derive information on various 
physical states along an evolutionary path. 
 
4. Stellar pluralism. We have now at hand the main sources of pluralism in stellar 
classifications illustrated at the beginning of this paper by the display of the several 
kinds to which a given star may belong. Different investigation techniques focusing 
on different structural properties result in different, cross-cutting classifications. To 
illustrate this form of pluralism, consider UV based classifications and visible based 
classifications. The structural properties governing manifest properties in the UV 
include properties (mass loss and gradient velocity of stellar wind, among others) that 
do not govern manifest properties in the visible. So that stars, when observed in the 
UV, may divide up in a way different from the way they divide up in the HR diagram. 
Two stars classified in a same category of spectral type in the visible may have 
different spectra in the UV.13 This simply reflects the fact that two stars may have 
                                                
13  Similar conclusions are reached when comparing spectral classifications in the 
visible and classifications based on stellar variability: it is not exceptional that two stars 
having the same spectral classification in the visible differ by their class of variability.  
 
 13 
similar structural properties governing visible manifest properties (say, similar 
temperature), but they may differ significantly by structural properties governing UV 
manifest properties (they may have different mass loss for instance).   
The use of one domain of wavelength rather than another reflects specific 
epistemic interests. Astrophysicists interested in, say, the physics of stellar winds need 
a UV-based classification, whereas those studying evolved stars surrounded by dust 
rely on infrared-based classifications. And the same goes for the choice of the level of 
resolution of the taxonomic units: astrophysicists interested in stellar magnetic fields 
need high-resolution spectral classifications whereas those studying the chemical 
composition of stars in order to understand the overall chemical evolution of a galaxy 
are happy with standard resolution levels. 
Stellar taxonomy should please pluralists on several grounds. Pluralists usually 
draw on the diversity of biological taxa to dismiss the monist quest for a unique 
correct way of classifying things (Dupré 1993, Kitcher 2001), whereas physics and 
chemistry are widely considered as monist-friendly (see for instance Ellis (2002) on 
the monist side and Slater (2005) on the pluralist side). Stellar taxonomy challenges 
this traditional partition by extending the domain of relevance of the pluralist claim 
beyond its usual domain, biology; what is more by adding to the pluralist’s moneybag 
a significant bit of the traditional ally of the monist, namely the physical sciences. 
Moreover, in light of similarities with the familiar case of the classification of 
chemical elements, stellar taxonomy invites us to reconsider the support this case 
traditionally brings to a monist standpoint on scientific classification. The main 
similarity between the two taxonomies is that in both cases, kind-membership is 
conferred by structural properties. But an important difference is that in the chemical 
case, a single microstructural property, to wit, nuclear charge, happens to be the 
overwhelming determinant of a large variety of chemical behaviors14, whereas we’ve 
just seen that no such single behavioral determinant is to be found in the stellar case.  
This invites us to clearly distinguish between two claims: the claim that the 
appropriate kind-membership conditions are structural conditions, and the claim that 
there exists a single kind-membership condition (or set of) that is central to explaining 
a large variety of behaviors. Structuralism and monism happen to both hold for 
chemical elements (and, incidentally, neither hold for biological species), but the 
                                                
14   As noted by Hendry (2006, 868), atomic weight, for instance, is a negligible factor, 
except for hydrogen where the isotope effect might be noticeable.  
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stellar case shows us that they do not always go hand in hand15: structuralism does not 
favor taxonomic monism over taxonomic pluralism. If chemistry is, on the face of it, 
hospitable to taxonomic monism, it is not because its kind-membership conditions are 
structural - if so, stellar taxonomy would also be monist-friendly. Inversely, a case for 
taxonomic pluralism does not require showing that structural kind-membership 
conditions cannot be found (note that this is a strategy commonly used by proponents 
of species pluralism – see for instance Dupré 1981).  
How then should one interpret the monist-friendliness of the chemical element 
case? Stellar taxonomy draws our attention on a central part of the answer, by putting 
to the fore what is admittedly much less manifest in other domains of the physical 
sciences, to wit, the interest-dependency of a taxonomic system. We’ve just seen that 
different, cross-cutting taxonomic systems respond to different epistemic interests 
about stars. Is this interest-dependency specific to astrophysics and an exception in 
the physical sciences? On the face of it, the classification of chemical elements seems 
rather immune to interest-dependency: nuclear charge does not have any serious 
competitor as a grouping criterion for chemical elements, which would respond to 
alternative epistemic interests. For all that, this consensus should not be interpreted as 
vindicating that the periodic table constitutes an interest-free classification of the 
chemical elements. It can be argued that it rather reflects the fact that, as Hendry aptly 
emphasizes when contrasting chemistry with biology: “the interests that govern its 
classifications are more unified […]” (2006, 865). For Hendry (2006, 874), the 
presence of “modal intentions” is what unifies the epistemic interests of the chemists. 
Dupré (2006, 30) also emphasizes the specific unified aims of chemistry as grounds 
for its taxonomic monist-friendliness. By contrast, no such unifying character is to be 
found in the epistemic interests scientists have in living organisms. Hence the much 
discussed interest-dependency and resulting pluralism of the groupings of living 
organisms. Population ecologists, for instance, do not group them according to the 
same parameters than biologists do. And even within biology, various theoretical 
perspectives notoriously translate into various grouping criteria defining distinct 
concepts of species, with the “Biological Species Concept” and the “Phylogenetic 
                                                
15   This association between structuralism and monism is often made, not only by 
monists such as Wilkerson 1993, but also by pluralists (see for instance Slater 2005). 
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Concept” being the most discussed ones16. But to make a case for the interest-
dependency of classifications in the physical sciences, pluralists have had so far to 
contend themselves with imaginary “fantasies” in which classifiers would have come 
up with different taxonomic systems, had they started with alternative or less unified 
epistemic interests.17 The good news for such pluralists is that astrophysics provides 
them with an actual case in the physical sciences to support their contentions that 
classifications are also interest-dependent in this domain.  
Another ground of comfort for pluralists is that stellar pluralism appears as a 
much less controversial ally than their traditional one. By contrast with species 
pluralism, there is no controversy about the permanent character of stellar pluralism. 
Whereas people disagree on whether biological taxonomy should aim at identifying a 
single correct species concept18, astrophysicists do not aim at coming up with a unique 
set of kind-membership conditions that would ground a unique correct way of 
classifying stars. On the contrary, they explicitly admit that a complete knowledge of 
the physical nature and the evolution of stars requires different, cross-cutting 
taxonomic systems, each depending on the technique of observation used and the type 
of physical processes the technique gives access to.19 And indeed we have seen, when 
skimming through the history of stellar taxonomy, that the more mature stellar 
astrophysics has become, the more pluralist its taxonomy. So that monists could 
                                                
16  For a recent overview of the lively discussions about species pluralism, see 
Ereshefsky 2007.  
17  Here’s how the fantasy may go: “Beings with different constitutions or with similar 
constitutions but different interests might begin with an alternative collection of manifest 
features, and their inquiries might single out alternative underlying microphysical structures, 
causally implicated in the cluster of characteristics that concerned them. Or perhaps the 
common causal factors would not be microphysical at all. Even in the case of the physical 
sciences, the alleged objective similarities carry a tacit relativization to our capacities and our 
interests” (Kitcher 2001, 50-51).   
18  See again Ereshefsky 2007 for a review of the arguments exchanged by monists and 
pluralists on the desirability of a single species concept.   
19  Here’s how a specialist in stellar classification expresses the fruitfulness of cross-
cutting classifications: “The success, however, of classifications in region beyond the 
traditional MK region (i.e. UV or near IR) comes when these extensions, at least in the first 
instance, are kept completely autonomous from the MK system, i.e. the specimen are allowed 
to find their own order. This allows the (possibly different) classification from each 
wavelength region to reflect the different information about the layers in a stellar atmosphere, 
which may be only weakly coupled. When the classifications are compared, then the insight 
can begin.” (Corbally, 1994) 
 At this point the monist could admittedly still claim that astrophysicists should not 
embrace pluralism, for they have yet to discover some more fundamental structural properties 
that would play a unifying role, but that would be at the cost of rejecting a huge chunk of 
solidly-established physics (a rather unappealing move). 
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hardly deny that astrophysics support taxonomic pluralism on the grounds that it is 
just too an immature and messy science to be a reliable source for philosophical 
arguments.  
The main upshot of my analysis of the grouping of stars is twofold. First, by 
challenging the idea (still widespread even among pluralists) that one domain at least, 
the physical sciences, is hospitable to interest-free, monistic classifications, stellar 
taxonomy further undermines the monist thesis (already significantly weakened by 
arguments drawing on the diversity of biological taxa) that there exists only one 
correct way of classifying things that science aims at discovering. Second, it shows 
that one may have several cross-cutting ways of grouping things all based on the same 
type of kind-membership condition, to wit, structural. In other words, stellar pluralism 
is less promiscuous, as regards kind-membership conditions, than taxonomic 
pluralism about living organisms, and therefore less prone to monist objections. For 
instance, Wilkerson’s attack against Dupré’s promiscuous realism on the grounds that 
too many of the kinds accepted by Dupré do not lend themselves to “serious scientific 
investigations” (Wilkerson 1993, 14), is irrelevant to the stellar case. Being all based 
on structural properties, stellar classifications do sort out stars into kinds that lend 
themselves to causal explanations and predictions. By contrast with the classifications 
of living organisms, they do not include any “useful system of classification” 
(Wilkerson 1993, 14) where any kind-membership condition goes, as long as it 
responds to peculiar practical or epistemic needs (as diverse as those of cookers, 
taxidermists, gardeners or professional biologists). For all that, are stellar kinds 
natural kinds?  
 
5. Are stellar kinds natural kinds? The issue takes us back to the central question I 
left unanswered earlier, about the correct reading of the notion of “privileged” 
similarity parameters. It is time now to spell out the proper reading of the notion in 
the astrophysical context.  
 As suggested by Slater (2005), taxonomic monism may be split into two 
claims: a claim about classification – there exists one unique way of classifying things 
– and a metaphysical claim about the objectivity and the uniqueness of the 
distinctions demarcating natural kinds. Here’s how Slater states that the latter does not 
imply the former: 
 17 
“The monist may thus grant that classification schemes can 
be as gerrymandered and parochial as you like (as need or interest 
dictates), so long as differences are sometimes ignored and 
sometimes regarded, rather than sometimes invented and sometimes 
discovered. Differences, the monist suggests, are discovered. 
Referential decisions may of course be made about which 
differences should be ignored in constructing a useful taxonomy of 
the world. Monism is a thesis about the actual kind distinctions 
(what natural kinds there are), not about the various ways we ignore 
those distinctions in cobbling together a workable system of 
classification. Classificatory pluralism does not entail metaphysical 
pluralism.” (Slater 2005, 30) 
 
So far only classificatory monism has been dismissed. Investigating which reading of 
the notion of “privileged” boundaries is valid in the stellar case will tell us whether, at 
least, metaphysical monism is tenable, or not. Metaphysical monism states that there 
exists some natural order, that is, some objective, mind-independent divisions that cut 
nature at its real joints in a unique way. In other words, the world comes prepacked 
with a unique set of objective divisions demarcating natural kinds. Note that 
metaphysical monism is stronger than realism. It does not only state that there exists 
real, mind-independent similarities and differences in nature; it also claims that there 
exists a uniquely privileged set of such similarities and differences, where “privileged” 
is conceived in an essentialist way. Sharing with Kripke (1972), Putnam (1975), Ellis 
(2002) and others a commitment to essentialism, here’s how Wilkerson (1993, 5) sums 
up the thesis: “[…] there are many similarities and differences between things, one set 
is privileged because they are the real essences”, the traditional candidates for essential 
properties being structural properties (for instance, genetic structures for biological 
species, molecular structures for chemical substances).  
So does the stellar world come prepacked with a privileged set of objective 
divisions demarcating kinds defined by essential properties? Let us consider first 
whether essentialism is tenable about stellar kinds, before addressing the issue of 
realism. Essentialism traditionally requires the following (see for instance De Sousa 
1984; Ellis 1996; Wilkerson 1993): kind-membership is conferred by possession of an 
essential property or properties, i.e. by a property or properties necessary and 
sufficient for membership of the kind in question. Moreover, essential properties are 
what determine law-like behaviors. Traditional essentialism also requires that a thing 
cannot belong to more than one natural kind (unless the kinds in question are 
hierarchically-nested kinds) and that natural kinds have sharp boundaries. In the 
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stellar case, structural properties (temperature, density, etc.) are also the obvious 
candidates to the status of essential properties, for they are the type of properties that 
determine stellar behaviors. But the kinds they demarcate cannot count as natural 
kinds for at least two straightforward reasons: stellar kinds do not have sharp 
boundaries and a star may belong to more than one kind (not to mention taxonomic 
nomadism). Sticking to an essentialist conception of natural kinds would lead to the 
contention that there are far more stellar natural kinds than the stellar kinds currently 
demarcated by astrophysicists. Actually, in light of what has been said about the 
continuous character of taxonomic parameters and the lack of infimic kinds, the quest 
for essential properties inevitably leads us to “individualism” about natural kinds, that 
is, to count as many kinds of stars as there are stars! But individualism is a rather 
unappealing option20, to say the least, for a central motivation for the search of natural 
kinds is that they are supposed to be the subject of scientific laws. When you want to 
explain or predict the behavior of a thing, you identify the kind to which it belongs 
and apply the laws known to be governing the members of that kind. Saving an 
essentialist conception of stellar kind would thus come at the price of giving up on the 
economy of work that scientific generalizations governing the behavior of natural 
kinds are supposed to provide. The metaphysical monist may agree to pay this price, 
but such a radically monistic ontology not only seems a bit desperate but also utterly 
irrelevant to actual scientific practice.  
 On an essentialist, monistic reading of the term, our quest for “privileged” 
similarities and differences demarcating stellar kinds has thus proved fruitless. For 
want of such a unique set of  “privileged” divisions, let us see now if, at least, a realist 
standpoint on divisions demarcating stellar kinds is tenable. Are differences 
demarcating stellar kinds objective? Are they discovered rather than conventionally 
marked by the classifier? We have to be careful here about what a negative answer 
means. Denying as I do that there are objective distinctions between stellar kinds does 
not mean that taxonomic features are not real, mind-independent features of the 
world. I do take temperature and density as objective features of the stellar world: no 
doubt, differences in terms of structural properties between individual stars are 
                                                
20  Note that a monist such as Wilkerson (1993, 16) bites the bullet and admits that 
individualism is indeed a possibility for biological species defined in an essentialist way by 
their genetic structure, but immediately adds that it is very unlikely that we finished up with 
as many natural kinds as individuals. No such potential escape from individualism is available 
in astrophysics.   
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discovered, rather than conventionally marked. But given the continuous variation of 
taxonomic parameters from one star to another, and the resulting vagueness and lack 
of infimic kinds, differences demarcating stellar kinds are not discovered but 
conventionally marked. Realism about stellar kinds is untenable.  
 So not only the stellar world does not come prepacked with a unique set of 
objective, privileged (in an essentialist sense) divisions, but also it does not come 
prepacked with objective divisions, tout court. In that respect, metaphysical monists 
and realists end up on the same boat: their only option to accommodate stellar kinds is 
to retreat to the unsavory individualist standpoint on natural kinds.  
 So, are stellar kinds natural kinds? Well, in light of the previous discussion, 
the answer is a ringing “no” on any realist reading of the notion, be it monist 
(essentialist) or pluralist (promiscuous realism à la Dupré)21. In other words, if they 
are “privileged” similarities and differences in the stellar world (and we have seen 
that, indeed, not any similarity parameters is taxonomically significant), it is not 
because they are objective, real ones, but because they define kinds that fullfill a 
useful role in scientific investigations. The appropriate reading of the term 
“privileged” in the astrophysical context is therefore an epistemological, interest-
depending one. It is important to emphasize at this point that none of the previous 
philosophical lessons would need to be revised if the contingent limitations of choice 
of taxonomic parameters (discussed in section 3) could be overcome: all the 
candidates deemed epistemically significant, including those not used for practical 
reasons, vary continuously from one star to another, thereby leading to similar 
conclusions as regards resolution-dependency, vagueness, lack of infimic kinds, etc. 
Given the correct reading of  “privileged” in the astrophysical context, the 
next step would be to specify in what epistemological sense exactly stellar taxonomic 
parameters can be said to be privileged, in order to examine whether they favor one of 
the current non-essentialist doctrines that ground the fruitful role natural kinds are 
taken to play in scientific inquiries in terms of explanatory power (Laporte 2004) or 
categories allowing reliable predictions (Boyd 1999, Griffith 2004). My hunch is that 
                                                
21  Here’s how Dupré sums up his thesis: “The point is not that there are no real 
divisions in nature between kinds of things, divisions that are appropriate for a particular kind 
of inquiry, but what those divisions are will depend on what the enquiry is.” (2002, 41) (My 
italics). Only the last part of the thesis holds for stellar kinds: the appropriate divisions of the 
stellar world do indeed depend on the enquiry, but the divisions are conventionally marked, 
not real.   
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stellar kinds will not be easily recruited by any of these doctrines, but establishing this 
point would require another paper devoted to a thorough analysis of the epistemic 
virtues of stellar kinds in terms of explanation, inductive prediction, etc. Meanwhile, 
one can at least raise the following question: if none of the current standpoints turned 
out to be hospitable to stellar kinds, would that be an embarrassment for those 
standpoints? This brings me to my brief concluding interrogative remarks on the 
relationship between actual scientific practice and philosophical doctrines of natural 
kinds.  
When navigating through the intricate variety of currently competing doctrines 
of natural kinds, from strong, essentialist ones (Ellis 1996, 2002; Wilkerson 1993) to 
more or less weaker, non-essentialist ones (Boyd 1999; Laporte 2004; Dupré 1993, 
2002; Griffith 2004), it is not always clear what their motivations and expectations are 
as regards existing scientific kinds. Is the relaxation of kind-membership conditions 
motivated by a desire to avoid ending up, in light of new scientific knowledge, with 
few candidates, or even no candidate at all, to the status of natural kind? Consider 
essentialism about biological species – for a long time the canonical examples of 
natural kinds. When traditional essentialism turned out to be untenable in light of 
post-Darwinian biological knowledge, was the development of more hospitable kind-
membership conditions driven by a desire not to relieve biological species from their 
traditional status of natural kinds?  If so, isn’t tailoring a doctrine of natural kinds so 
that it includes one’s favorite candidates (biological species being the most coveted 
ones) a bit circular? For what makes certain kinds paradigmatic examples of natural 
kinds to start with anyway? To come back to the stellar case, if none of the current 
standpoints on natural kinds can accommodate stellar kinds, what will be the 
appropriate attitude? Tailoring a weaker doctrine that accommodates this newcomer, 
or claiming: “so much for stellar kinds, they are just not natural kinds”? The point I 
want to make is simply the following: whatever the answers to those questions are, 
they will need to be justified. As newcomers in the field, what stellar kinds make thus 
vivid is the need, when discussing doctrines of natural kinds, for being explicit on 
general meta-commitments, to wit, commitments about what should be the constraints 
on those doctrines brought by the kinds defined and successfully used by practicing 
scientists. All the more reason for ending the philosophical disgrace of stellar kinds 
 21 
since Darwin’s and Cournot’s outdated verdicts and putting stars back on the agenda 
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